Beijing is increasingly portraying confrontations with Philippine forces in the disputed South China Sea as domestic law enforcement matters rather than disputes between sovereign states, a shift that analysts say is intended to reinforce China’s territorial claims while avoiding the political costs of direct military escalation.The latest example came after a July 20 clash near Second Thomas Shoal, where both China and the Philippines accused each other of initiating violence.While the incident involved Philippine military personnel, Chinese officials described it as interference with the Chinese coast guard’s “normal law enforcement” operations, framing the confrontation as an administrative enforcement action within what Beijing claims is its own jurisdiction.Several analysts told The Epoch Times that Beijing is using the Chinese coast guard to create the appearance of administrative control over disputed waters while portraying confrontations as law enforcement rather than military conflicts. The analysts spoke on condition of anonymity or only revealing their last names due to fear of reprisal.The July 20 confrontation occurred near Second Thomas Shoal, a disputed reef in the South China Sea.The Philippine military said Chinese coast guard personnel struck a Philippine navy servicemember in the head with a wooden baton and damaged a Philippine boat during the encounter.China’s coast guard, meanwhile, accused Philippine vessels of approaching and attacking Chinese ships.The dispute prompted both governments to summon each other’s diplomats in protest.Sea Row Enters New PhaseAt a regular press briefing on July 21, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian said personnel aboard a Philippine military vessel grounded at Second Thomas Shoal had “violently interfered with the China coast guard’s normal law enforcement,” adding that Chinese authorities had responded “resolutely in accordance with the law.”A Chinese observer familiar with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) system, surnamed Yao, told The Epoch Times that Beijing’s choice of words deliberately shifts the nature of the dispute.“The Philippines deployed military personnel, yet Beijing says they obstructed China coast guard law enforcement,” he said.“Under this narrative, the China coast guard becomes the lawful administrator, while Philippine military personnel are portrayed as violating China’s sovereignty. That suggests the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] is attempting to place a foreign military within the scope of its own administrative jurisdiction and treat Second Thomas Shoal as part of China’s domestic territory.”Rather than describing the incident as a confrontation between the armed forces of two countries, Beijing’s language places Philippine service members in the position of subjects being managed by Chinese law enforcement, he said.Second Thomas Shoal lies within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone under international law.In 1999, Manila intentionally grounded the naval vessel BRP Sierra Madre on the shoal and has maintained a small military detachment there ever since. Beijing, which claims sovereignty over the shoal, has repeatedly demanded that the Philippines remove the vessel and has frequently used coast guard vessels to intercept Philippine resupply missions.A Philippine flag flutters from BRP Sierra Madre, a dilapidated Philippine Navy ship that has been aground since 1999 and became a Philippine military detachment on the disputed Second Thomas Shoal, part of the Spratly Islands, in the South China Sea March 29, 2014. Erik De Castro/ReutersDuring the July 21 briefing, China’s Foreign Ministry again asserted Chinese sovereignty over the shoal and urged the Philippines to restrain its “frontline personnel.”Yao said the wording minimizes the military status of the Philippine personnel and instead depicts Chinese coast guard officers as law enforcement officials responding to attacks.“It’s clear the CCP is characterizing this dispute as a domestic law enforcement matter,” he said. “It’s similar to its recent practice of deploying coast guard vessels rather than naval warships in operations targeting Taiwan.”China’s coast guard has previously described Philippine resupply missions as activities subject to Chinese inspection and supervision. Although the two sides reached a temporary arrangement on resupply operations in 2024, Beijing has continued to claim it supervises those missions.Building Claims of Administrative ControlA Chinese scholar of South China Sea issues living in Singapore told The Epoch Times that Beijing has spent the past decade trying to establish itself as the dominant power in the western Pacific.“Beijing wants to create the impression that whether the Philippines can resupply Second Thomas Shoal depends on permission from the China coast guard,” he said. “Every so-called inspection of Philippine vessels adds another piece of evidence supporting Beijing’s claim that it exercises administrative jurisdiction there. Repeated over time, those actions accumulate into what China argues is effective control.”The scholar explained that relying primarily on coast guard vessels also carries strategic advantages.“If the Chinese navy directly intercepted the Philippine navy, the incident would more easily be viewed as a military confrontation between two countries and could prompt a U.S. response under the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty,” he said. “By using the coast guard instead, Beijing can portray ramming, blocking, boarding, and physical confrontations as maritime law enforcement rather than military operations, keeping them below the threshold of open conflict.”However, the scholar noted that the China coast guard is no longer a conventional civilian law enforcement agency. It is now part of the People’s Armed Police, which is under the command of the CCP’s Central Military Commission and can coordinate operations with the People’s Liberation Army Navy and China’s maritime militia.“As tensions escalate, the navy remains available to provide military support,” he said. “Putting the coast guard on the front line doesn’t mean China’s military has stepped back.”A Chinese coast guard ship (right) and a vessel identified by the Philippine coast guard as a Chinese navy ship (background left) are seen from the Philippine coast guard vessel BRP Cabra during a supply mission to Sabina Shoal in disputed waters of the South China Sea on Aug. 26, 2024. Jam Sta Rosa/AFP via Getty ImagesDual Roles of China Coast Guard A Chinese military scholar, surnamed Meng, told The Epoch Times that the China coast guard effectively performs two functions simultaneously.“Externally, it presents itself as a law enforcement agency, reducing the risk of triggering a military response,” Meng said. “Operationally, however, it answers to the Central Military Commission and has the support of the navy. Beijing is placing military pressure inside a law enforcement framework.”He said Beijing has already used coast guard operations around Taiwan to reinforce its claims of administrative jurisdiction and is now applying the same model to confrontations involving foreign militaries in the South China Sea.“The process is straightforward,” Meng said. “First, Beijing declares the disputed waters to be Chinese territory. Then it labels coast guard activities as normal law enforcement. Finally, it places Philippine military personnel in the position of people being subjected to that law enforcement.”On July 22, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met his Philippine counterpart in Manila. The Philippines protested what it described as attacks on its personnel, while Wang accused Philippine vessels of ramming Chinese patrol boats and criticized some Philippine military and police personnel for provoking the confrontation. Both sides again exchanged diplomatic protests over the clash.Zhou Yu contributed to this report.
Beijing Recasts South China Sea Clashes as Law Enforcement to Bolster Territorial Claims: Analysts
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