Why Europe can still face a gas crisis without a gas shortage

Gas prices in Europe have risen again following disruptions to LNG supply chains linked to tensions in the Middle East. This comes as the European Union enters the final phase of its plan to phase out Russian gas. The scale of the physical disruption is limited when compared with the loss of Russian pipeline flows in 2021 and 2022, yet the price response has been disproportionately large. This contrast points to a change in how risk is transmitted in the European gas system. In moving away from Russian gas, the EU has reduced exposure to physical supply interruption, but it has not removed exposure to price shocks. Marzia Sesini explains how energy security affects both prices and volumes. The disruption of Russian gas supplies in 2021 and 2022 exposed risks associated with dependence on a single supplier and on inflexible pipeline infrastructure. The EU response set out first in the REPowerEU Plan and then developed further in the 2025 roadmap, rests on two pillars: lower gas demand and supply diversification – principally through pivoting toward LNG. This has strengthened the resilience of physical gas supply, but arguably left the EU more exposed to price volatility in global markets. Russian gas imports declined sharply after the 2022 energy crisis, with Russia’s share of EU gas demand falling from 39% in 2021 to 12% in 2023. In 2024, the EU still imported around 52 billion cubic metres of Russian gas, which reflects both the scale of the transformation and the difficulty of fully eliminating such a large supplier. As a result, the framework for completing the phaseout has become more stringent, with a binding phased prohibition on imports of Russian pipeline gas and LNG by November 2027. The Commission’s updated implementation guidance, issued after the 2026 Middle East disruption, also clarifies that the phaseout now has to be managed under conditions of tight LNG supply and intensified competition for cargoes. This point matters because the present system differs from the one that existed before 2022. Less than 10% of EU gas supply is linked to flows through the Strait of Hormuz, yet TTF prices have risen to around €60/MWh, more than double pre-crisis levels. By contrast, the Russian energy crisis involved the loss or threatened loss of around 45% of EU consumption, but average prices between the period spanning October 1 2021 – October 31 2023 were around €90/MWh, roughly triple pre-crisis levels. The difference suggests that price responses are not proportional to the scale of physical disruption. What’s the outlook for EU energy independence? It remains to be seen whether the Middle East crisis will be as extreme or as long as the Russian energy crisis, but this simple comparison suggests that in a global LNG market, relatively modest supply risks can produce large price effects even when aggregate supply remains sufficient. In this sense, diversification has reduced bilateral dependence and risks of acute physical disruptions without eliminating price exposure. EU issues simplified gas rules ahead of the Russian ban The Commission’s March 2026 guidance on implementing REPowerEU reflects this shift. It advises Member States to minimise administrative barriers to non-Russian LNG imports and accelerate authorisation procedures to avoid worsening price pressures in a period of tight supply. The same document acknowledges that the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has created significant shortages on the world LNG market and intense competition for cargoes. Those adjustments do not change the direction of the Russian phaseout. They show, rather, that even in a more diversified system, disruptions continue to be felt through prices instead of physical shortfall. The timing of the current disruption is also relevant. The EU is entering its annual storage filling season, with storage levels currently at five-year lows and operators required to reach 90% capacity ahead of winter. These obligations increase demand for spot cargoes (on-demand shipping) and strengthen the bargaining position of global suppliers. This does not imply a risk of physical shortage, but it will likely amplify price effects. On March 26, EU lawmakers approved the EU-US trade Turnberry trade deal while attaching a set of conditions to the agreement, after previously deeming it “unbalanced.” The EU’s weak bargaining position is further evident in the context of its binding trade agreement to purchase $750 billion worth of US energy by 2028. With Middle Eastern energy supplies shown to be vulnerable to disruption, the EU is increasingly reliant on the US. In turn, the US is using this position to seek more favourable trade conditions in other sectors. At the same time, it has pushed for changes to EU Methane Regulations and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, arguing that compliance costs will affect export competitiveness. This places pressure on the EU to reconcile its environmental and social objectives with the price and security of its energy supply. The phaseout of Russian gas has altered the shape rather than the existence of vulnerability in the European gas system. Exposure to a single supplier has been reduced, and the resilience of physical supply has improved. At the same time, reliance on global LNG markets has left the EU exposed to concentrated supply, transport disruptions, and market speculation. Renewables to power EU independence The central question is no longer only how to replace Russian gas, but how a system increasingly organised around global LNG markets transmits shocks into European prices and, through them, into industrial competitiveness, inflation, and the wider economy. At the heart of the original REPowerEU plan was the long-term mission to transform Europe’s energy system to one based on clean, competitive, and secure local renewables. Four years later, the 2026 Middle East energy crisis has only strengthened the case for the legitimacy and urgency of this pathway. A weekly e-mail in English featuring expertise from scholars and researchers. It provides an introduction to the diversity of research coming out of the continent and considers some of the key issues facing European countries. Get the newsletter!