CUSMA Is Becoming an Economic-Security Pact. Canada Should Treat It Like One.

CommentaryCanada’s current negotiations with the United States are about more than tariffs. They are increasingly about the economic and security architecture of North America—and whether Canada is prepared to treat economic security as part of national security.Prime Minister Mark Carney’s “elbows up” message emerged from legitimate concerns: the Trump administration has shown a willingness to use tariffs, market access, and American economic weight aggressively, and Canada was right to defend its interests. But the current negotiations also reveal an important reality. Canada is not seeking distance from the U.S. economy; it is working to preserve privileged access to it.That distinction is important because CUSMA is evolving beyond a conventional free-trade agreement. Washington is placing increasing emphasis on rules of origin, supply-chain resilience, economic security, and on limiting the ability of non-member countries to gain indirect access to the North American market. This is partly commercial policy, but it is also an expression of the wider strategic competition with China.That creates a difficult question for Ottawa. While Canada has increasingly described its relationship with Washington in terms of resilience and diversification, the federal government has simultaneously deepened economic ties with Beijing. In January 2026, Canada and China announced an updated strategic partnership covering trade, investment, energy, financial services, and other areas, intending to substantially increase Canadian exports to China. There are legitimate commercial reasons to expand access to Asian markets, but not all countries are the same.Canada’s own security agencies continue to identify the People’s Republic of China as a major source of cyber espionage, foreign interference, and economic intelligence activity directed against Canadian interests. That doesn’t mean trade with China should stop. It does mean, however, that Chinese investment, technology, supply chains, and infrastructure require a different level of scrutiny than engagement with trusted allies. CUSMA is likely to make that distinction increasingly important, particularly where Canadian market access depends on confidence in the integrity of North American supply chains.Forced labour provides one of the clearest examples. Canada committed under CUSMA to prohibit the importation of goods produced with forced labour. At the same time, the United States has since argued that Canadian enforcement has been inadequate and has taken trade action in response. The concern is not simply whether a Canadian company directly uses forced labour, but whether goods or components produced through coercive labour practices enter Canada through third-country supply chains and are then incorporated into products destined for the United States.That creates a direct economic-security risk for Canada because a product assembled domestically may still contain upstream inputs that raise concerns under U.S. forced-labour law. The same principle can apply to batteries, minerals, solar components, textiles, automotive parts, and other products associated with complex Chinese supply chains. From Washington’s perspective, the broader question is becoming increasingly straightforward: can CUSMA remain a trusted economic perimeter if one member becomes a pathway for goods, capital, or technology that would otherwise face restrictions in the United States?Canada should take that question seriously because the same logic extends well beyond forced labour. Canadian ports are essential to trade diversification, but they are also digitally enabled strategic infrastructure. Equipment, software, logistics data, and operational systems can create vulnerabilities that are not captured by traditional commercial assessments alone. Finance presents a similar lesson. The TD Bank money-laundering case demonstrated how weaknesses inside a major financial institution can become a wider security problem when failures in anti-money laundering governance create opportunities for organized crime, sanctions evasion, illicit finance, and potentially hostile-state activity.Trade, finance, cyber networks, ports, and supply chains can therefore no longer be treated as separate policy silos. They are interconnected systems through which economic leverage and national power are increasingly exercised, and this is where the Canada-U.S. narrative requires greater balance.The United States can be a difficult and sometimes coercive partner, and Canada should continue to negotiate hard and protect its own interests. But disagreements with Washington are not strategically equivalent to the challenges posed by a state that Canadian security agencies identify as conducting espionage, foreign interference, and cyber operations against Canada. The issue is not whether Canada must choose between the United States and China in every commercial transaction. It is whether Canada can preserve deep access to an increasingly security-conscious North American market while expanding exposure to Chinese capital, technology, and supply chains without stronger safeguards.That is ultimately the question CUSMA is forcing into the open. Economic security now sits alongside tariffs and market access, meaning Canada will need stronger forced-labour enforcement, tighter scrutiny of strategic investment, resilient critical infrastructure, effective anti-money-laundering controls, and better protection of sensitive supply chains.The “elbows up” narrative captured a period of real frustration with Washington, but the next phase of Canadian policy requires something more durable than political rhetoric. Canada’s objective should be resilient interdependence: defending its sovereignty, diversifying where sensible, preserving trusted access to the North American economy, and ensuring that diversification does not create new strategic dependencies.CUSMA is increasingly becoming the mechanism through which that balance will be tested. Economic security is national security, and Canada’s trade policy should reflect that reality.Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.